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The ambivalent role of gender in redefining
the German nation
PETRA ROSTOCK
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SABINE BERGHAHN
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ABSTRACT Since the maxim of Germany as a non-immigration country was
finally relinquished at the end of the 20th century, the country has struggled with
redefining itself as an immigration society and inventing a modified national
identity. Our article argues that gender has come to play a pivotal role in this process
of redefining a ‘German’ identity because it helps secure the ‘self’ by creating the
Muslim/migrant ‘other’ as culturally different. Under the pretext of preventing
women’s rights violations, a renewed debate on integration and the duties of
migrants is taking place. While we criticize the deployment of gender against the
civic recognition of Muslims, violations of women’s rights within minority groups do
exist and must be combated. Our article offers some preliminary considerations as
to how public agencies can intervene effectively against practices that are harmful
to women, without in the process demonizing minority groups.
KEY WORDS gender equality ● gender-specific violence ● Germany ● headscarf
● migration ● multiculturalism ● Muslims
So-called honour crimes and forced marriages have recently become a
major issue on the German political agenda. This is not to say, however, that
such crimes had not taken place in Germany before. Forced marriages have
existed in Germany at least since the first ‘guest worker’ generation came
to the Federal Republic of Germany1 over 40 years ago. Although the up
side of this public attention is a long-needed debate on the measures
required to prevent such crimes, the sudden attention is not without
problems. It has led to a generalization of individual cases even though no
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reliable figures on the problem exist: Islam and the entire Turkish or Muslim
population are generally thought to oppress women.
This sudden interest in the rights of Muslim migrant women needs to be
understood in a broader perspective. When the maxim of Germany as a
non-immigration country was finally relinquished at the end of the 20th
century, a new self-definition of the German nation had to be formulated.
Gender has come to play a pivotal role in this process of redefining a
‘German’ identity. A renewed debate on integration and the duties of
migrants is taking place under the pretext of preventing the violation
of women’s rights. At the same time, the social and economic problems of
migrants are being ignored, and the shortfalls of German integration policy
obscured. The perceived oppression of Muslim women, ostensibly proven
by so-called honour crimes, forced marriages and the headscarf, serves to
substantiate the idea that Islam in general and Muslims in particular are not
(yet) part of German society. Gender equality serves as a marker of modern
liberal German society even though it is far from being fully realized.
Although government statements welcome Muslims in Germany and call
Islam a part of Germany, reality offers a different picture. The fact that the
demand for Islamic religious education, the introduction of ‘Thoughts for
Friday’2 and the building of mosques have caused, and still cause, major
debates in the public sphere and the media, shows that Germany is far from
accepting Islam as part of its society.
To substantiate our thesis, we first set the context by outlining Germany’s
long road to becoming an immigration society, tracing the development of
multiculturalism and describing the impact of an ethnically defined concep-
tion of citizenship. Subsequently, we discuss how the issue of gender
equality is utilized to work against the civic recognition of Muslim migrants.
Our critique of the current state of migration policies with regard to gender
equality is completed by showing how the legal measures debated in
relation to forced marriage or ‘honour’ crimes serve to restrict migration
and create resentments against the Muslim minority. We close the article
with a normative focus on initiatives from within the German-Turkish
community, as well as from federal states, which attempt to intervene
effectively against practices that are harmful to women, without in the
process demonizing minority groups.
THE LONG ROAD TO BECOMING AN IMMIGRATION
SOCIET Y
With the formal acceptance that migrants were here to stay in Germany,
there was a shift in perceptions of them. Migrants have always been
referred to as ‘foreigners’, regardless of their citizenship, but Muslims and
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their religion are now at the centre of the current debate on Germany as
an immigration society. Muslims are defined as a homogenous group, and
the diversity of (former) migrants is also ignored. Simultaneously, the
process of redefining Germany as an immigration society is accompanied
by attempts of politicians of almost all persuasions to fill ‘Germanness’ with
new content. As a result of the lessons learned from the National Socialist
regime, ‘German’ is not referred to as an ethnic category. It is associated
rather with secularity and gender equality, treated as general attributes of
modern societies, and with a specific form of religion and religiosity and
‘German value system’ (deutsche Werteordnung) supposedly originating
from Christian ethics. Although it is stated and even demanded that Islam
must find its place within the German value system (cf. Schäuble, 2006), it
remains unclear where this place could be – particularly, when there is no
societal consensus as to what ‘German values’ are and what role the
Christian religion should play. Do these values encompass the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms (clearly not a unique German
value), or identification with the German national soccer team, including
enthusiastic waving of the German flag (something the German authors of
this article, at least, certainly would not do)?
A delegitimized nation
The historical breaks in German history, the country’s late unification in the
19th century and its 40-year-long division in the 20th century have all
contributed to the difficulties in defining a national identity. Following the
atrocities and defeat of the National Socialist regime, the nation’s identity
was deeply discredited. ‘German’ identity was then defined by distancing
itself from the historically burdened national identity. Former government
administrations in West Germany tried to define their national interests in
a way that did not come into conflict with European interests, preferring
multilateral policy. Undisputed support of European integration became
the trademark of West Germany’s foreign and European policy. The
Federal Republic’s state identity was thus fundamentally Europeanized,
whereas the national identity was predominantly oriented towards
Germany as a cultural nation (Beyme, 2004: 72; Schild, 2003: 32–3). Yet a
shared and unique German culture seems to be a myth, as the presumption
that Germany has more homogeneity of culture, religion and so forth than
its neighbour states lacks plausibility (Elwert, 2001: 129).
Legally, the ‘nation’ has traditionally3 been defined in ethnic terms (by
descent), a definition that is even determined by article 116 of the consti-
tution (Elwert, 2001: 135).4 Until the introduction of the Nationality Act in
1993 and its reform in 2000, German citizenship was defined according to
the Citizenship Law of 1913: in terms of ethnicity, passed on through blood
lineage (jus sanguinis). Therefore, foreigners in Germany were not entitled
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to naturalization. They could apply for it only after having lived in Germany
for a very long time, and the administrative decision was left to official
discretion.
As Joppke (1999) rightly points out, the long-standing official maxim that
Germany is ‘not a country of immigration’ was not so much a description
of reality as a political-cultural norm grounded in the ethnocultural mode
of West German nationhood:
While in principle delegitimized by its racist aberrations under the Nazi regime,
ethnocultural nationhood was indirectly reinforced and prolonged by the
outcome of World War II, with the division of Germany and the scattering of
huge German diasporas in communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Against this backdrop, the Federal Republic defined itself as a vicarious,
incomplete nation-state, home for all Germans in the communist diaspora . . .
[Therefore] it prioritized the immigration of co-ethnics . . . Opening the national
community to foreigners would have posed the risk of a redefinition of national
identity, and of diluting the Federal Republic’s historical obligation to its
dispersed and repressed co-ethnics in the East (Joppke, 1999: 63).
Moreover, Turkish migrants’ own uncertainty as to whether they would
return ‘home’ and the political class’s refusal for a long time to acknowl-
edge that the ‘guest workers’ were there to stay made it possible to hold
onto the perception of West Germany as an ethnically and culturally
homogenous collective.
The idea of West Germany as a multicultural society was first introduced
in 1980 in a symposium held by the Catholic and the Protestant churches.
In preparation for the ‘Week of the Foreign Citizen’ (‘Woche des ausländis-
chen Mitbürgers’), the symposium issued a number of theses. One stated
that ‘In the federal republic we are living in a multicultural society’ (Evan-
gelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), 2007). At that time, the term was
highly controversial. With its appeal for the recognition of ethnic and
cultural minorities in West Germany and its demand for their juridical and
political equality, ecumenical Christianity contradicted public and official
opinion (Frank, 1995: 36). Although by the 1980s the migrant presence in
the cities was inescapable, the permanence of immigration had not been
recognized. Immigrants were still denied equal rights and citizenship.
Instead, a range of short-term measures was introduced to improve the situ-
ation in schools and the social arena, for example by helping children to
cope with their living situation in West Germany. At the same time, migrant
children were prepared for eventual return to their parents’ country of
origin. In the long run, these measures did not lead to integration but rather
to the reinforcement of social separation and a high degree of educational
disadvantage for migrant children (Schierup et al., 2006: 147).
The public discourse at the time was characterized by fear of foreign
infiltration and inundation, as West Germans ‘discovered’ the Turks as
Muslims and constructed foreigners as ‘others’ with an insurmountably
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alien religion (Frank, 1995: 37). The image of the oppressed Turkish woman
that has become so prominent in contemporary debate was at the time used
only by West German feminists, who focused on the perceived victimization
of migrant women and claimed superiority in knowing what is ‘right’ for the
‘poor migrant woman’ (Beck-Gernsheim, 2006). But this image was not yet
taken up by policy makers. The discourse on multiculturalism in West
Germany was divided into two irreconcilable positions: one embracing the
cultural diversification of West Germany and willing to recognize migrants
as members of society, the other rejecting foreigners in an attempt to
preserve the notion of a homogenous West German society.5 Still, West
German multiculturalism remained an intra-German affair in which ethnic
immigrant groups were only marginally involved.
Slow changes
The 1980s debate on multiculturalism already reflects certain elements of
the current redefinition of a ‘German’ identity through the construction of
a (Muslim) migrant ‘other’. Yet at that time, the maxim of West Germany
as not an immigration country was still being upheld, while gender equality
and the situation of migrant women were mainly issues within feminism and
the women’s movement. It was the unification of the two German states in
1990 and the end of Communism that made the definition of Germany as
a delegitimized, incomplete nation-state obsolete, providing for a more
relaxed attitude towards the German ‘no-immigration’ maxim (Joppke,
1999: 63).
In 1993, German citizenship law was reformed through the introduction
of the Nationality Act. For the first time, a legal claim to naturalization was
introduced, its precondition being 15 years of legal and permanent resi-
dence in Germany or just eight years for foreigners between the ages of 16
and 23. Hence, the jus sanguinis was supplemented with some elements of
the jus soli. But when the government changed from the coalition of the
Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Party to the coalition of the
Social Democratic Party and the Green Party in 1998, the no country of
immigration tenet was finally given up officially. The new government
heralded a decade of integration, and a new Nationality Act came into
effect in 2000. Since then, foreigners with eight years of legal and perma-
nent residence in Germany have been entitled to naturalization. Further
preconditions are proof of sufficient knowledge of the German language,
impunity, loyalty to the constitution and financial independence. Children
of foreign parents are given German nationality (jus soli) if one parent has
had legal and permanent residence in Germany for at least eight years and
a permanent residence permit for at least three years. These children can
also keep the nationality of their parents, but between the ages of 18 and
23 they must choose one nationality (Özcan, 2005). Nevertheless, there are
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a number of cases in which it is permissible to have one or more foreign
nationalities in addition to German nationality (Die Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 2005: 44–5).
Although ethnic belonging is no longer the only way to gain individual
access to citizenship, the German conception of citizenship insists on
conformity to a set of values that is shared by all citizens, making cultural
assimilation a precondition for naturalization (c.f. Koopmans et al., 2005).
The prevalent view holds that integration should precede naturalization,
meaning that migrants must demonstrate their ‘Germanness’ before they
may acquire citizenship. It seems unrealistic, however, to expect integration
into German society when citizenship and full participation in public and
economic life are withheld (International Crisis Group and Laurence,
2007: i).
The new government also appointed an independent commission on
immigration, which pointed out in its final report that Germany had been
a country of immigration for many years and that immigrants were needed
in Germany both for economic and for demographic reasons.6 The
commission proposed a comprehensive integration policy requiring reforms
and special measures in education, social welfare, the labour market and
other areas (Schierup et al., 2006: 150). At this point, the situation of women
played only a marginal role, with the commission merely affirming the need
for protection of women from gender-specific persecution. In January 2005,
the new Immigration Act came into effect, recognizing gender-specific
persecution.7 Women’s organizations voiced criticism over the fact that no
women’s associations participated in the legislative process. In particular,
the German Women Lawyers Association argued that the selection criteria
for the immigration of foreign employees would lead to the recruitment of
mainly young, male migrants with a natural-scientific or technical training,
while female migrants were viewed primarily either as family members or
as unskilled workers for the low-wage sector (Diewell and Thomsen, 2002).
A new ‘Occidentalism’?
The change in migration policy and the recognition of immigration as a
political norm revealed a growing number of deficiencies concerning the
integration of migrants, particularly with respect to equal opportunities in
education and the job market. These shortcomings, along with the assassi-
nation of the provocative Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, kindled
a new debate on multiculturalism in Germany.8 The diagnosis issued by the
media and politicians was that multiculturalism in Germany had failed –
even though it had never officially existed as a policy. Multiculturalism was
used as a negative concept on which to blame any malfunction in the co-
habitation of minority and majority societies. The results of previous
German policy on foreigners – ‘a kind of benevolent, paternalistic, and
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egalitarian (or pseudo-egalitarian) apartheid, an institutionalized separate-
ness’ (Brubaker, 2001: 538) – were blamed on the few ‘multicultural ideal-
ists’ who had been advocating in vain the recognition of migrants as
members of German society.
As we have stressed, the official end of the no-immigration maxim and
the now obsolete definition of Germany as a delegitimized, incomplete
nation state, necessitated a new definition of ‘German’ identity. Unfortu-
nately, this process has not so far brought about changes in the societal
structure or the traditional self-perception as a homogenous society.
Instead, arguments formerly brought forward to establish that Germany
was not a country of immigration are now employed in the process of
forming a new identity. The majority society seems to find the oriental and
patriarchal ‘other’ necessary for its own self-definition, and uses it to
preserve the fiction of a national homogeneity. The construction of homo-
geneity serves to fulfil several purposes at once, not least to obscure the
obvious ‘cultural’ and political differences between East and West
Germany. Gabriele Dietze, following Fernando Coronil (1996), defines this
need for a (Muslim) ‘other’ in order to secure or reconstruct the ‘self’ as a
new ‘Occidentalism’ (Dietze, 2004). These renewed expressions of ‘Occi-
dentality’ can be most clearly observed in current debates on a ‘deutsche
Leitkultur’ (‘German leading or hegemonic culture’) and the ‘German
value system’. These debates construct an insurmountable cultural
difference between the Christian occidental ‘us’ and the Muslim ‘other’, a
difference seen as manifesting itself both in the ‘alien’ religion of Islam and
in the field of gender relations. Central to the debates on the integration of
migrants and their religion into the German society is the social position of
Muslim women. This is hardly a coincidence, as the gender relations of the
‘other’ have always served as the symbol for the backwardness and
barbarism of the colonized (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2006: 427–34).
Therefore, while there has been some opening up in the ethnic definition of
the German nation, the ultimate marker of difference between ‘them’ and
‘us’ still seems to be the question of gender equality.
THE UTILIZATION OF GENDER AGAINST THE CIVIC
RECOGNITION OF MUSLIMS
The issue of gender equality works against the civic recognition of Muslims
on at least two levels – in public discourse and in law. In accordance with
the view of a ‘Christian Occidental us’ and a ‘Muslim other’, the predomi-
nant image of the foreign woman in public discourse is that of the oppressed
Turkish or Muslim woman. Migrant women are typically represented as
victims, either of German society or of Turkish men. They are seldom
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depicted as active agents, and when they are, this depiction is described as
the exception to the rule. In addition, the oversimplified image of the poor
oppressed Muslim woman is coloured by a claim of superiority on the part
of German society in general (Beck-Gernsheim, 2006). The dangers of such
essentializing views have been recognized at least partly in German gender
and migration research, but positive, non-essentializing images of migrant
women in the German public and media remain rare. One reason why
gender equality seems to work so well against the civic recognition of
Muslims is that the victimization of the ‘other’ woman serves as the screen
through which the Christian European woman and society is distinguished
as progressive and emancipated (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2006: 427).
Additionally, reports of violent acts such as ‘honour’ crimes, and the general
perception of Islam as oppressive to women, stir up fears of falling back
behind the already achieved status of gender equality.
The headscarf debate
With regard to gender equality, one indicator for the differentiation
between a Christian-Occidental ‘us’ and a Muslim ‘other’ are the anti-
headscarf laws passed by a number of federal states following the ruling of
the Federal Constitutional Court in September 2003.9 The main argument
put forward for prohibiting the headscarf but no other religious symbols is
that the headscarf is not a religious but a political symbol for the oppres-
sion of women in Islam. Through this, the anti-headscarf laws prohibit
teachers from displaying symbols and wearing clothes that express their
adherence to a specific religion, ideological faith or political opinion that
contravenes the duty of public servants to behave neutrally. Yet the laws
include an exception clause for the display of Christian-Occidental values
and traditions. Although the interpretations of this clause are not unani-
mous, the principal political aim is to tolerate Christian symbols, such as
nuns teaching at public schools in their habit, while prohibiting the head-
scarf. Legislators have thus used the headscarf as an instrument of
demarcation against the Muslim ‘foreigners’.
In public discourse, the division between positions for and against the
headscarf runs right through German society and even divides political
parties, the Christian churches and the women’s movement. But gender
equality is always central to the line of argument: the headscarf is depicted
either as a symbol of the oppression of women or a symbol enabling so-
called neo-Muslims (Nökel, 2002; cf. also Karakas,og˘lu, 2003; Klinkhammer,
2000) to emancipate themselves from their parents and participate in
German society. The debate has created strange allies exactly because the
headscarf enables various groups to instrumentalize gender against the civic
recognition of Muslims. Conservative opponents of the headscarf and some
feminists, such as Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Seyran Ates, and other
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authors with a Turkish migration background, cite the order to veil the
female body or hair as evidence of the incompatibility of Islam with
German values of democracy and freedom. Past and present oppression of
and hostility towards women is ignored. In the context of growing anti-
Islamism, religious fundamentalism and continued violence against women,
this position also ignores the complex intersections of racism and sexism.
The paternalistic stance that positions Muslim women as oppressed victims
may provoke a prioritization of struggles within migrant communities, with
the allegedly more important fight against racism or anti-Islamism
supplanting any challenge to gender violence (Castro Varela and Dhawan,
2006: 434). To wear a headscarf voluntarily10 does not mean that a woman
promotes forced marriage, nor does it compellingly imply that women are
subordinated to men, nor does it show why girls should not participate in
sports, school trips or other activities. The simple denunciation of the
headscarf as a symbol for the oppression of women is just one example of
a growing tendency to deploy aspects of gender in order to ‘prove’ the
anti-egalitarian, patriarchal orientation of Islam in general.
Double standards
When the circumstances are auspicious, even officials unenthusiastic about
gender rights convert into firm believers and strugglers for the rights of
women, and even homosexuals, revealing a remarkable capacity for double
standards. As in the headscarf debate, this was again the case in the debate
on naturalization tests in early 2006. These tests were directed only at
specific migrants in Germany. Resettlers from eastern and southern
Europe, facing socioeconomic difficulties similar to those of other migrants,
do not have to take tests because they are considered ethnic Germans.
Moreover, the tests alleged certain values (gender equality, acceptance of
homosexuality) and knowledge (geography, history) as the German norm,
in ways that are far from reflecting actual social consensus. When the
federal state of Baden-Württemberg introduced, in January 2006, a ‘values
test’ for Muslim migrants applying for German citizenship, to ensure that
they shared the basic values of the Federal Republic, Muslim organizations
and numerous politicians criticized the discriminatory nature of the test.
The examination questioned migrants not only on their attitudes towards
democracy and terrorism, but also the relationship between women and
men, homosexuality, and so forth, posing questions such as: ‘What do you
think about the statement that a wife should obey her husband and that he
is allowed to beat her if she is not obedient?’ Or, to take another example:
‘Imagine your adult son comes to you and explains that he is gay and that
he wants to live together with another man. What is your reaction?’
Some weeks later, the Home Secretary of the federal state of Hesse
decided to develop his own naturalization test under the slogan ‘Knowledge
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and values’. This required profound knowledge of German history, the
German political system, the European Union, and German art, music and
literature, and again asked questions about the role of men and women in
society. In acknowledgement of the critical reactions to the first test, the
Hesse government emphasized that the examination was directed not only
at Muslim migrants. But the test also posed highly gendered questions: ‘A
woman should not be allowed to go out in public or to travel without the
company of a close male relative. What is your opinion of this statement?’
The governments of both states are otherwise rather conservative with
respect to the equality of men and women and the rights of homosexuals;
their naturalization questionnaires therefore leave the distinct impression
that gender equality is being employed opportunistically in order to
demonize Muslim migrants and ‘prove’ their backwardness.
Women’s rights seem to work as a highly effective means to mobilize
emotions: not only do the ‘poor oppressed Muslim women’ need our help;
‘we’ also have to protect our modern gender and sexual politics. Instead of
reflection on the very recent modernization of values and lifestyles that has
taken place in Germany’s majority population, there seems to be an implied
symbolic order: ‘we’ have successfully overcome our own conservative
gender model, and do not now want this reversed by ‘backward’ migrants.
‘They’ have to take their place at the end of the queue and must adapt to
‘our’ value system, even when this is more a myth than a reality. After
discussions lasting months, the Home Secretaries of all German federal
states agreed on joint criteria for naturalization, making a German language
and a naturalization test binding. The standards are still to be worked out,
but it has already been decided that topics will include the equality of men
and women.
The alien bride
Even before the discussion on naturalization tests, Germany had found its
authentic informant on patriarchal Turkish life in Germany. Shortly after an
‘honour’ killing of a young woman from a Kurdish family living in Germany
had called public attention to the issue, Necla Kelek’s book Die fremde
Braut (The alien bride) was published (Kelek, 2005). As María do Mar
Castro Varela and Nikita Dhawan (2006: 436) put it, in this moment a
hegemonic listening, which only listens to what stabilizes the prevailing
circumstances, amalgamated with the demand of politicized minorities for
the right to their own, authentic voice.
In Die fremde Braut, Kelek, a sociologist born in Turkey who came to
Germany with her family at the age of nine, first describes her family history
and her own way to freedom and self-determination. The second part of the
book is devoted to so-called import brides. Despite admitting that there are
no reliable studies on the number of forced marriages in Germany, Kelek
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asserts that nearly every other marriage of Turkish migrants is either an
arranged or a forced marriage, and that there is no difference between the
two categories (2005: 214–25). She admits that there are ‘different’ Turks
who have accepted German society and its rules as their own and have
integrated themselves, yet maintains that these remain the exception to the
rule, and that the majority of the two million plus people of Turkish origin
have neither taken this road nor are willing to integrate (2005: 260 & 262).
While Kelek is certainly right to stress that any forced marriage is a human
rights violation that must be punished, her book endorses prevailing notions
of Turkish ‘parallel societies’ in Germany and of Islam as a barbaric religion
and the root of all patriarchal evil. Because of its decontextualized repre-
sentation of the Islam as barbaric and the enemy of Muslim women, Kelek’s
book received harsh criticism. Unfortunately, most of her critics have fallen
into the same essentializing trap.
On 2 February 2006, the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit published
a petition initiated by Yasemin Karakas,og˘lu and Mark Terkessidis. Signed
by 60 migration researchers, the petition criticized the use of essays based
on the personal experience of women such as Necla Kelek,Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
Seyran Ates, and others to enlighten the public and politicians about
arranged and forced marriages and ‘honour’ crimes. A central target of their
critique was the dissemination through Kelek’s book of cheap clichés about
‘Islam’ and ‘the Turks’. The researchers pointed out that forced marriages
and ‘honour’ crimes do take place and must be combated with laws. In their
analysis, however, crimes in the name of ‘honour’ are a political and not a
moral problem and cannot be ascribed to Islam in opposition to western
civilization. Because the phenomenon of migration comprises not only the
Muslim minority, but also the everyday discrimination faced by both
Muslim and non-Muslim migrants in the field of education, they called for
a rational discussion about the future structure of the immigration society
(Terkessidis and Karakas,og˘lu, 2006). Necla Kelek (2006) responded a week
later that her critics had had the time, money and employees to analyse
questions of forced and arranged marriages, ‘honour’ crimes and ethnic
segregation, but had ignored these issues because they did not fit into their
ideological concept of multiculturalism and because they did not want to
see the human rights violations behind these issues.
These two letters triggered a heated media controversy (Butterwegge,
2006) in which the most sorely missing component was a representation of
Muslims and Islam as complex, heterogeneous and diverse according to
their own historical, regional, ethnic and class-specific contexts, as well as to
the different experiences of migrants. The reaction of the petition’s authors
to accounts of gender violence within Muslim communities – routine
belittlement and negation – was hardly expedient and no less essentializing.
Moreover, in their critique, efforts to address sexist violence are subordi-
nated under the allegedly more important struggle against racism. Almost
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none of the reactions to Kelek’s book examined how images of oppressed
Muslim women can be utilized to argue that the Muslims do not fit into
German society because of their cultural ‘otherness’ (cf. Castro Varela and
Dhawan, 2006).
Necla Kelek and a few other Turkish-German advocates of women’s
rights have been readily accepted by German officials as ‘authentic’ inform-
ants on the violations of women’s rights occurring within the Turkish
community. Their role is problematic because they reproduce the dominant
discourse on the differences or incompatibility between an emancipated ‘us’
and a patriarchal ‘Muslim other’. Their successful emancipation could be
viewed as indicating the heterogeneity of the Turkish community in
Germany; instead, they are seen as, and often depict themselves as, the
exception to the rule. As a consequence, the stereotype of the ‘oppressed
Turkish woman’ persists (Çelik, 2003). It becomes difficult for German
Muslims to define for themselves what being ‘Muslim’ means (cf. Spielhaus,
2006). Moreover, the representation of Kelek and others as lone yet strong
fighters against patriarchy within their own culture and religion obscures
the fact that they can be seen as part of a larger movement against gender
violence within minority groups.
The most striking aspect of the Kelek debate is that forced marriages and
‘honour’ crimes have long been identified and addressed by academic
experts and women’s rights organizations but have never gained the
attention of the public or politicians. With the rise of the debate on the re-
definition of ‘German’ identity, it seems as if the issue of gender-specific
violence within Muslim communities has been exploited for the purpose of
a restrictive integration regime. As described above, at the centre of the
debate is the demand for the integration of migrants, which is justified by
pointing to ‘honour’ crimes, forced marriage, a high rate of violence among
migrants in general, and a tendency to separation and/or isolation. The Inte-
gration Summit and the Islam Summit, both initiated in 2006, as well as the
amendment of the Immigration Act enacted in August 2007, suggest that it
is more important to demand stricter rules for allegedly problematic groups
than to discuss in detail how to combat violence while at the same time
accepting migrants as Germans with full equal rights.
Restricting migration in the name of women
Up to now, most of the policy measures needed to combat gender-specific
violence within minority groups in Germany have not been drawn up or
passed. As part of the Integration Summit, and under the topic ‘Improving
the situation of women and girls, achieving gender equality’, a working
group coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Justice developed proposals
on ‘integration through law’. The group focused on protection from
violence in the private sphere in general and from forced marriage in
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particular. In the summary of its work, the group highlighted the need for
empirically sound findings, information on potential victims and perpetra-
tors and publicity through awareness-raising campaigns, and advocated the
establishment of specialized shelters for persons affected by violence. But
these demands are far from new. Non-governmental organizations such as
Terre des Femmes e.V., which has been working continuously on both
forced marriage and crimes committed in the name of ‘honour’, have been
and still are making the same demands (cf. Volz, 2003). But the public
authorities at the lower levels of administration who most commonly deal
with victims of violence still fail to protect minority women and men
because of a lack of intercultural sensitivity, a lack of knowledge about these
forms of violence, and even a lack of knowledge about possible legal and
administrative aids. Often, youth welfare offices, and even courts, view
violence in migrant families not as a social problem but as a private matter
or a cultural problem. The internal structures of migrant families are likely
to be seen as ‘exterritorial’ problems (Arpat, 1999: 61; Gedik, 2005: 321).
In the past, forced marriage was regarded as a criminal offence of
coercion. In October 2004, the German parliament passed legislation
making forced marriage a particularly severe case of the offence of
coercion, punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment (Bielefeldt, 2005:
24). Two years later, the Federal Council of Germany (Bundesrat) intro-
duced a bill aimed at making forced marriage an element of an offence sui
generis, in order to ostracize forced marriages socially and arouse an aware-
ness of injustice, particularly among the relatives directly involved. Up to
now, the bill has not been discussed in parliament. Human and women’s
rights experts question the efficacy of such laws: they do not anticipate
many complaints on the part of the victims because that would mean
opposing their own families, and in many cases this would be too momen-
tous a step. What is really needed to combat forced marriage and other
forms of gender-specific violence (within minority groups) is an elaborate
policy strategy based on sound findings and composed of interlinked
outreach, shelters, and a comprehensive education and sensitization of
policy makers, responsible administrative agencies, teachers and police, as
well as potential victims and their families. The experiences gained during
the struggle of the second German women’s movement against domestic
violence teach us that the road to realizing the necessary measures is long.11
In the meantime, however, violations of women’s rights are being employed
to enforce new restrictions on immigration. In other words, on the level of
law, too, gender is utilized to argue against the civic recognition of migrants.
Disguised as a measure to provide protection from forced marriage, the
amendment to the Immigration Act establishes new hurdles to immigration.
Among other regulations, the subsequent immigration of spouses is allowed
only for partners who are at least 18 years old and who can demonstrate a
basic knowledge of the German language. Spouses from the USA,Australia
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or Japan can still move to Germany without having to fulfill these criteria.
Women’s rights activists and experts have argued that the age and language
restrictions do not constitute effective provisions: the basic requirement for
subsequent immigration is the consummated marriage; thus, the law does
not prevent forced marriages. Apart from the above-mentioned strategies,
what would be needed in legal terms is an extended right to return for
victims of marriage abduction and a right to residence independent from
the spouse. But such open regulations concerning the right to residence are
not likely to be introduced. In sum, up to now violence within minority
groups has not been combated successfully, yet at the same time this
violence has been exploited to create resentment against Muslims in
Germany.
A LONG ROAD AHEAD
When forced marriages, ‘honour’ crimes or the headscarf are castigated as
violations of universal human rights, a universalism is employed that
becomes a rejection of the ‘other’, both in the form of denying many civil
rights for migrants and of challenging an ethno-pluralistic understanding of
the German nation. As we have pointed out, Germany is currently in the
process of redefining ‘German’ identity, a process that started when the
maxim that Germany is not an immigration country was finally abandoned.
Characteristic of this redefinition process is the attempt to preserve the
fiction of national homogeneity despite the realities of immigration and the
obvious ‘cultural’ differences within German society. The ultimate marker
between a Christian occidental ‘us’ and the (Muslim) ‘other’ remains the
question of gender equality: gender proves to be a useful tool to secure the
image of German society as modern and emancipated. At the same time,
this progressive gender regime is depicted as being undermined by less
emancipated migrants. While these lines of argumentation bear the risk of
demonizing minority groups, drawing a clear line between an emancipated
‘us’ and a barbaric or at least backward ‘other’, the normative question that
remains is how public agencies can intervene effectively against practices
harmful to women, without in the process demonizing Muslim minorities.
To close our article, we offer some preliminary considerations that require
further development.
Contrary to what the exceptional status of Necla Kelek and others
suggests, a number of migrant organizations have initiated activities against
forced marriage and/or ‘honour’ crimes. Among the first was the secular
Turkish Association of Berlin and Brandenburg (TBB), which issued a 10-
point plan calling for ‘zero tolerance’ towards violence against women and
encouraged other Turkish and Islamic organizations to speak out against
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crimes committed in the name of ‘honour’.12 The TBB identified the need
to reinforce the funding of projects that offer targeted help to endangered
women and provide awareness training, especially in schools. The latter
need was partly taken up by a postcard campaign initiated by a social
worker at the Berlin girl’s club MaDonna.13 The girl’s club had already
created two postcards against forced marriage under the slogan ‘Till death
do us part’.14 Two German-Turkish boys in Berlin subsequently had them-
selves photographed for the campaign, under the slogan ‘Honour is to fight
for my sister’s freedom’.15 Twenty thousand postcards were printed and
circulated at the beginning of 2005. In the future, postcards will also be
printed in Arabic and Turkish and distributed selectively in male domains
such as cafés and sports clubs. A poster campaign with the same theme is
being planned.
The MaDonna postcard campaign served as an inspiration for the visual
component of a larger state campaign called ‘her freedom – his honour’.
The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Integration started this
campaign in November 2006, together with a surprisingly large alliance of
migrant organizations and prominent women such as Alice Schwarzer and
Seyran Ates, , both of whom otherwise represent, as we have mentioned, a
feminism with sometimes anti-Islamic overtones.16 The campaign comprises
all the necessary aspects identified above. It aims not only to create public-
ity and awareness, but also to send a signal to women affected that there is
help if they need it. Moreover, the campaign sets out to redefine terms such
as ‘honour’, providing further education on the issue, and has developed an
approach to combating forced marriage that is supplemented by an online
consultancy.17 But perhaps even more important, the minister of integration
of North Rhine-Westphalia, Armin Laschet – a Christian Democrat –
emphasized that this campaign is not about demarcating the majority from
the minority society, but about focusing on shared values and cooperation.
This initiative even includes the engagement of the Turkish newspaper
Hürriyet, a popular paper with around 200,000 readers in Germany. This
had earlier led a week-long campaign against German-Turkish authors such
as Serap Cileli, Necla Kelek and Seyran Ates, because of their outspoken-
ness against ‘honour’ crimes and forced marriage and their fight for
women’s rights. But in May 2005, the newspaper changed its position and
expanded a campaign against family violence, started in Turkey, to Germany
as well. This change of course is furthered by the recent ‘honour’ campaign.
The campaigns presented here demonstrate that public agencies can
intervene effectively against practices harmful to women without demoniz-
ing minority groups. Moreover, the initiatives undermine many of the
assumptions voiced in German public and politics about migrants, Muslims,
gender and values. If ethnic minorities are to become truly part of German
society, migration policy, and particularly the fight for the recognition of
migrants and the prevention of gender-specific violence, needs to be
ROSTOCK AND BERGHAHN ● GENDER AND THE GERMAN NATION
345-364 092447 Rostock (D)  22/7/08  15:52  Page 359
formulated and implemented not as a special policy but as a regular part of
social policy, aimed at limiting the risk of increased inequality and social
disintegration for all (Bommes, 2007: 5). If initiatives continue to be under-
stood as special policy, specific to minority groups, the symbolic charge will
encourage one-sided blame for the failures of integration, exemplified in
forced marriages and the like. This failure will be blamed on the refusal of
migrants to integrate, or – even worse – on a general inaptitude of Muslim
migrants because of their cultural ‘otherness’. Any positive effects may be
thwarted by an equivocal form of universalism that labels gender violence
among migrants as cultural, while dismissing it in the majority society as
individual. In this way, women’s rights may continue to be used as a marker
to distinguish ‘them’ from ‘us’, when what is really needed is to create
diverse alliances to tackle oppressive forces of any kind.
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Notes
1 When we speak of ‘Germany’ we refer to the history of the Federal Republic
of Germany. We do not analyse the migration policies of the German
Democratic Republic.
2 ‘Thoughts for Friday’ is analogous to ‘Thoughts for Sunday’, a five-minute-long
broadcast every Saturday evening on public television in which Catholic priests
and Protestant ministers express their views on Christian and theological
questions. So far, ‘Thoughts for Friday’ is only published online.
3 ‘Traditionally’ here refers to the view advanced by leading scholars and conser-
vative politicians, as reflected in the laws. Before the unification of 1990, parts
of the German Left in West Germany, in particular critical theorists, tried to
define the German nation as a constitutional nation (Verfassungsnation).
4 Article 116 of the constitution, or Basic Law, defines as ‘German’ not only
citizens but also refugees or expellees of German descent.
5 Cf. Dirke, 1994, and Frank, 1995, for a detailed history of German multicultural-
ism.
6 See Unabhängige Kommission ‘Zuwanderung’ (2001) for a summary of the
report.
7 The act regulates three main areas: the immigration of foreign employees, the
acceptance of refugees and the integration of new immigrants. Furthermore,
questions concerning security and the fight against terrorism are included.
8 One explanation as to why the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands
triggered a debate on multiculturalism in Germany is that, with it, the German
ETHNICITIES 8(3)360
345-364 092447 Rostock (D)  22/7/08  15:52  Page 360
361
public and officials came to the conclusion that Islam posed a threat not only in
countries such as Iran, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan or Sudan but also in Europe.
9 So-called anti-headscarf laws, with an exception for Christian-Occidental values
and traditions, have been passed in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse,
Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia.
10 How such a voluntary nature can be ascertained is still to be determined.
11 German legislation had been quite reluctant to combat domestic violence,
viewing it as a private or cultural problem. It took over 20 years until, on
1 January 2002, legislation on protection against domestic violence
(Gewaltschutzgesetz) was enacted.
12 The 10 points to fight intolerance towards violence against women are: (1) Zero
tolerance towards violence against women; (2) no tolerance towards repressive
attitudes on the pretext of religious or traditional reasons; (3) ostracism of values
that discriminate against women; (4) public and active commitment of all Turkish
and Islamic organizations to the right of women to self-determination; (5)
promotion of discussions about equal rights for women within the Turkish and
Islamic communities; (6) strict prosecution of forced marriages, and information
campaigns on the subject within the Turkish and Islamic communities; (7) inter-
cultural opening of educational facilities and promotion of the intercultural
competence of teachers; (8) establishing of a professorship in Islamic theology
at a Berlin university, introduction of Islamic religion as a subject at Berlin
schools; (9) enforcement of the duty to attend school lessons in swimming, sports,
biology and sexual education; (10) public presentation of the intrinsic values of
Islam (cf. Türkischer Bund in Berlin-Brandenburg (2005).
13 For more information, cf. MaDonna Mädchenkult.Ur e.V. (n.d.).
14 In German: ‘Bis das der Tod uns scheidet.’
15 In German: ‘Ehre ist für die Freiheit meiner Schwester zu kämpfen!’
16 For more information, see Ministerium für Generationen, Familie, Frauen und
Integration (n.d.).
17 See Mädchenhaus Bielefeld e.V. (n.d.).
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